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False Witness? EU-Funded NGOs and Policymaking in the Arab–Israeli Conflict

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The relationship between the European Union and Israel is complex, and while cooperation exists in many fields, it has also been described as “troubled and, at times, volatile.”¹ In recent years, a major source of contention concerns the tens of millions of euros allocated in the budgets of the EU and some of its member states for a group of strident political advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Gaza.

Officials from European government institutions and from many of the NGO recipients operate in a framework that seemingly aims to promote universal human rights principles and humanitarian objectives. On this foundation, reports and analyses published by NGOs are used by the EU as sources of information. In many cases, NGO reports form the factual and analytical basis for EU policy analyses and recommendations on central political issues related to the conflict.

Through this European government support, as well as close political relationships, political advocacy NGOs gain important visibility and exercise substantial “soft power,” which, as defined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”² When referring to NGOs in this context, Nye recognizes that “NGOs and network organizations have soft power resources and do not hesitate to use them.”³ NGOs foster the idea that they are committed to universal morality and are untainted by partisan politics or economic objectives. They also promote the perception that they possess expertise in their respective fields. Certainly NGOs benefit from their ability to convey that message.

For the EU, soft power and public diplomacy are not residual or secondary elements in relation to military and economic “hard power,” but rather are often the primary vehicles used to exert international influence. Thus, political NGOs operating both within Europe and in other countries are tools by which to further EU norms, interests, and objectives, and, as noted by researchers such as Ian

Manners, this often occurs without the consent of other sovereign states.⁴ Despite being termed “non-governmental,” NGOs receive hundreds of millions of euros annually from European governments and the EU to promote objectives such as “democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.”⁵

Such funding is central to promoting European policy in the Southern Mediterranean,⁶ and has greatly enhanced NGO budgets, power, and influence. Among the key frameworks that provide funds to NGOs for political activities is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), with an annual budget of €160 million. That organization operates under the auspices of the Europe Aid Cooperation Office.⁷

In contrast to their stated objectives, the evidence indicates that many of the NGOs funded through this body (and other programs) act in ways that are inconsistent with the EU’s vision for the Middle East. While the recipient organizations, which are based in the PA, Israel, Gaza, as well as in a number of Western European countries, claim to promote these values, a comprehensive examination demonstrates that the NGO agendas are often far removed from them. Large sums officially provided under the banners of promoting peace and humanitarian concerns are instead used for narrow political purposes. Many such NGOs, as demonstrated below, skew the data and analysis according to their private agendas, promote the Palestinian narrative, and ignore the security context of Israeli policies. In particular, the NGO-led campaigns are an integral part of the 2001 Durban NGO Forum strategy of political warfare that applies double standards in targeting Jewish national self-determination, sovereign equality, and the right to self-defense.⁸

The close NGO–EU relationship resulting from large-scale funding is reflected in a number of documents written by, or under the auspices of, EU representatives in Israel and the PA between 2010 and 2012. The seven documents, which were selectively leaked to journalists and NGO officials, include recommendations that if implemented, would have a profound impact on EU–Israel and Israeli–Palestinian ties. The information in the documents was provided by Israeli and Palestinian political NGOs, and in many cases is demonstrably false, out of context, or one-sided. As a result, the recommendations provided are not suitable for EU policymaking, and may actually serve to push the sides further apart and contribute to conflict, rather than promote peace or human rights.

This practice has also increased friction between Israel and Europe, as reflected in the media, Knesset discussions, and official statements. In February 2013, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official referred to reports from EU heads of missions in east Jerusalem and Ramallah as resulting from their living in an “echo chamber.”

He went on to state, “As a result, it is not a surprise that they come out with one-sided partisan reports. ...This is a structural problem. One part of the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy is institutionally anti-Israel, where their whole milieu is Palestinian activists on the West Bank and NGOs that share their same agenda.”⁹

Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis of these documents highlights the systematic reliance of the EU on political groups, to the point where it appears that the EU does not have the ability to independently gather information or verify it when supplied by a third party, at least with respect to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Analysis

Since 2010, seven documents from the offices of EU representatives and delegations in Israel and the PA have been leaked to the Israeli and international media:

1. “EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem” (December 2010);¹⁰
2. “EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem” (December 2011);¹¹
3. “EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem” (December 2012);¹²
4. “Area C and Palestinian State Building” (July 2011, draft report);¹³
5. “Situation of Arab-Israeli citizens” (November 2011, confidential Report);¹⁴
6. “EU Heads of Mission Report on Settler Violence” (April 2011, internal report);¹⁵ and
7. “EU Heads of Mission Report on Settler Violence” (February 2012, update).¹⁶

The circumstances surrounding the leaking of these documents appear to reflect disagreements between the EU member states with respect to the reports’ content and recommendations. The EU report on Area C was provided to selected journalists in unfinished draft form, including incomplete and missing references.¹⁷ No explanation was provided as to why a final text was not distributed. Regarding the report on “settler violence” (2012), the document notes that the Netherlands had placed it under “general reserve,” blocking formal publication of the document and its update. Anonymous officials then apparently leaked this draft to a Dutch NGO, “The Rights Forum,” founded and directed by former Dutch Prime Minister Andreas van Agt, who is politically active in the conflict.¹⁸ According to media reports, the 2012 “EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem” was leaked to the Israeli political advocacy NGO Breaking the Silence, which is funded directly by the European Commission (EC).¹⁹

Jerusalem

The issue of Jerusalem is highly complex and sensitive, reflecting the religious and national attachments to the city on the part of both Israelis and Palestinians. Therefore, all decision making in the area must be based on careful research. The 2010, 2011, and 2012 EU Heads of Mission reports on Jerusalem lack the substantive references or footnotes that can be expected of official papers that include major policy recommendations. Upon analysis, it is evident from the data presented, the language, and the specific topics discussed that the reports are based mainly on NGO publications of questionable accuracy and reliability.

In particular, the section entitled “Planning Demolition, Evictions and Displacement” in the 2011 report closely reflects a document produced by a political NGO known as ICAHD (the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions), and entitled “No Home, No Homeland: A New Normative Framework for Examining the Practice of Administrative Home Demolitions in East Jerusalem” (2011). ICAHD is headed by a self-described “radical,” and its agenda is highly partisan. ICAHD publications accuse Israel of “apartheid,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “field testing weaponry and tactics [on Palestinians] to be exported...and further perfecting its model of sustained control, of warehousing—the Matrix of Control—in the Palestinian laboratory.” Between 2010 and 2012, ICAHD received €169,661 from the EC via the EIDHR funding framework²⁰

When discussing the issue of building permits in Jerusalem and their impact on Palestinians, the EU (2011) document claims that “[t]he Planning regime poses a difficult dilemma for Palestinian families: they have the choice between migrating outside the municipal area of Jerusalem or building without the necessary building permit.” This closely resembles the statement in ICAHD’s report “No Home, No Homeland” that “Palestinians are faced with the harsh choice between leaving their East Jerusalem homes or building without authorization...”²¹ In this section, as in others, no information is cited from Israeli government or municipality sources.

Similarly, the “Archeology” section of this EU draft document on Jerusalem appears to be based on information from the Israel-based political NGO Emek Shaveh. This NGO, “focusing on the role of archaeology in Israeli society and in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict,” was granted NIS 211,947 (approximately NOK 314,787, or some €42,000) in 2011 by Norway.²²

The 2012 EU report expands upon, and gives greater prominence to, the one-sided political language reflecting increased collaboration between Emek Shaveh and EU policymakers, including the unsupported claim that the “archeological

activity around the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount exclusively stressing the historical connection of the Jewish people...undermines the universal character of the city."²³ Another Emek Shaveh publication contains the assertion that "excavation sites are changing the lay of the land, lending force to an historical narrative focusing on the Jewish people, and marginalizing the Palestinian residents from their environment and from their connection to the Temple Mount/al-Haram a-Sharif."²⁴

The "Education" discussions in the 2011 and 2012 EU reports on Jerusalem closely echo an annual joint report from two other NGOs: The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and Ir Amim. ACRI, a leading Israeli NGO dealing with many aspects of civil and human rights relating to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, received NIS 1,069,271 (approximately €215,000) from the EU in 2012. Ir Amim, a group that plainly declares its role as opposing Israeli government policies regarding Jerusalem, was granted €965,040 from the EU for the years 2010–2013.²⁵ Other sections of the report appear to be based on OCHA and US State Department reports, which in turn also rely extensively on NGO narratives. Further reflecting the NGO–EU relationship, the 2011 EU report on Jerusalem concluded that there was a "deterioration on the ground," as well as unjustified home demolitions and discrimination in healthcare, education, and housing. Similarly, in the EU's 2012 publication, Israel is castigated for "systematically undermining the Palestinian presence" in the city.

In all three EU reports on Jerusalem and the accompanying policy recommendations, no information is presented that is inconsistent with the positions of the political advocacy NGOs that were selected by the EU for funding and policy analysis. For example, in 2011, the Jerusalem municipality reported that it provided building permits for Arab residents of Jerusalem at a level comparable to that of Jewish residents;²⁶ built post offices, public clinics, and classrooms in Arab neighborhoods;²⁷ inaugurated the light rail (tram) line, which serves both Arab and Jewish neighborhoods; and started to implement other programs for the benefit of the city's Arab population.²⁸ None of this information is mentioned in the NGO documents or the EU reports. Similarly, there is no sign that EU officials sought to verify the NGO narratives, either through third parties or via the Israeli government and officials from the Jerusalem municipality.

This failure to verify political claims is illustrated in the section on residency and land ownership in the 2010 EU Jerusalem report, which states that "[i]n East Jerusalem 35 percent of the land has been expropriated for 'state land'. Only citizens of Israel or those legally entitled to claim Israeli citizenship (i.e., Jewish) can buy property built on state land."²⁹ This appears to be based on a report entitled "Settlements in Focus: Top 6 Bogus Excuses for East Jerusalem"³⁰

Settlement Expansion,” (2010) prepared by Americans for Peace Now, an NGO affiliated with the Israeli organization Peace Now (which is funded by the EU), and by the NGO known as Terrestrial Jerusalem.³¹ According to that NGO’s report, “Under Israeli law, to qualify to purchase property that is ‘state land’ the purchaser must either be a citizen of Israel...or legally entitled to citizenship under the law of return (i.e., Jewish)... Palestinian Jerusalemites [are] barred from purchasing in the 35 percent of East Jerusalem that Israel has expropriated as ‘State Land’ since 1967...”³²

In copying these politicized NGO claims, the EU report misrepresented Israeli law, and implied that state racism was at play. Israel’s Land Law (1960) as well as numerous court rulings bar discrimination in the sale of state land, and explicitly allow for every citizen or permanent resident (including east Jerusalem residents) to purchase property built on state land, regardless of religion, race, or nationality.³³

In addition, both the 2010 and 2011 NGO and EU reports justify widespread illegal building by Palestinian residents based on a need to circumvent Jerusalem’s legal procedures and processes in order to obtain construction permits and avoid “the risk of residency revocation,” which can occur when individuals legally register a new address outside of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries.³⁴ However, the reports fail to note that Arab residents of Jerusalem are entitled to Israeli citizenship, thus enabling them to retain their legal status and its accompanying benefits, even if they leave the city. According to media reports, the number of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem applying for citizenship has increased significantly in the past decade.³⁵ For others, the exercise of this right is rejected for political reasons.³⁶ None of this information is included in the EU reports on Jerusalem.

These EU reports also minimize the security or historical context of various measures taken by Israel in response to the “Second Intifada” beginning in 2000, from which time 1,233 Israelis have been killed.³⁷ This creates the impression that these responses, such as the security barrier (the “Wall”) or other measures, were imposed arbitrarily. This is apparent in all three EU reports on Jerusalem, in sections that closely reflect a publication provided by three EU-funded NGOs—Adalah, Al-Mezan, and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel—entitled “Ambulances Prevented from Entering Palestinian Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem without Prior Approval or Police Escort.”³⁸ Based on this NGO publication, the EU Heads of Mission reports argue that the “requirement for Israeli ambulance staff to enter Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem only under police escort” regularly results in “unnecessary, and potentially life-threatening, delays for Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem.” However, the NGO and EU reports do not include information regarding numerous incidents of Israeli ambulances being attacked while responding to emergency calls in Palestinian neighborhoods.³⁹

Access to Jerusalem's "Holy Basin" in general and the Temple Mount in particular is among the most sensitive and complex issues in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and involves controversies such as repairs to the Mughrabi Bridge (the main access point for non-Muslims to the Haram al-Sharif). In the 2011 EU report, this controversy is presented in a way that accuses Israel of exacerbat[ing] tensions," which again erases essential context. For instance, Sheikh Raed Salah, the leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, called for an "Intifada"⁴⁰ against the renovations of the bridge and stated that the Israelis "want to build their Temple while our blood is on their clothing, on their doorposts, in their food and in their water."⁴¹

The EU 2012 report attributes a reported "sharp increase in violent incidents in the Haram al-Sharif" to a "sharp rise in the frequency and visibility of visits" by Jewish groups described as "radical."⁴² Here again, the information presented is highly filtered, and fails to mention violent riots initiated by Palestinians on the Temple Mount, in which petrol bombs were hurled at the police and attempts were made to attack Jewish visitors to the site.⁴³ Similarly, while Israel is condemned for "selectively enforcing legal and policy restrictions on religious freedoms and on access by Christian and Muslims religious worshippers to their holy sites located in Jerusalem/Old City," the Waqf's⁴⁴ refusal to allow non-Muslims to pray on the Temple Mount, as well as unauthorized excavations that carry major religious impact, are not mentioned.⁴⁵ On this important issue, as well as others related to Jerusalem's complexity, the EU's outsourcing of foreign policy papers to highly partisan NGOs with narrow agendas is problematic to say the least.

EU Report on Area C

Similar to the other documents, NGO data and claims serve as the basis for the leaked EU report "Area C and Palestinian State Building" (2011), which deals with another sensitive and complex issue in the conflict.⁴⁶ More than half of the references in this report cite NGO publications directly, or indirectly via the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),⁴⁷ including many incorrect or unverifiable claims.

For example, the report cites Save the Children UK (2009) for a central claim that "[p]rior to the Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinian population of the Jordan Valley was estimated at between 200,000 and 320,000. Today the population is approximately 56,000..."⁴⁸ This is used as evidence for the claim that "the Palestinian presence in Area C has continuously been undermined...by Israel as [the] occupying power." These numbers, which were included in the Save the Children publication, were taken from the Palestinian NGO MA'AN Development Center (2008), and are inconsistent with various other MA'AN

reports.⁴⁹ In this case, MA'AN cited no external sources for the data. The available evidence demonstrates that these population claims, which were adopted by two political advocacy NGOs before being copied into an EU document, are greatly inflated. According to the 1961 Jordanian West Bank census, the population of the "Jericho district" (which may, at most, have referred to the entire Jordan Valley or at least to the city of Jericho and its environs, the most populated part of that area) was 63,980.⁵⁰ According to Israel's 1967 West Bank census, the population of the Jericho district was 9,078. According to the same 1967 census data, the entire population of the West Bank was approximately 600,000 and the Jericho district was one of the least populated regions of that territory.⁵¹ If the MA'AN/Save the Children/EU data were accurate, the Jordan Valley would have been the most populated district of the West Bank, not the least.

One-third of the references of the EU Area C document come from four OCHA reports: "Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank" (December 2009); "West Bank Movement and Access" (June 2010); "Area C Humanitarian Response Plan Fact Sheet" (August 2010); and "The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor" (January 2011).

OCHA reports are also largely based on data from a narrow group of political NGOs, as well as on other OCHA documents, creating a closed circle of unreliable citations and references. For example, the references in "Restricting Space" include twenty-two references (45 percent) to data from three NGOs, nineteen of which quote the same report authored by the Israeli NGO Bimkom, which received NIS 351,340 from the EU in 2012.

EU Report on the Arab Citizens of Israel

On December 16, 2011, several media platforms in Israel and Europe published excerpts from a "classified EU document" discussing another complex and sensitive issue—the status of Arab-Israeli citizens.⁵² The excerpts included recommendations that the EU treat this as a "core issue, not second tier to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." The accounts also reported that the document is meant to be understood as "food for thought," as opposed to a policy "report."⁵³

According to *Haaretz* and *The Independent*, the document discussed "[t]he stalemate in the peace process, and the continuing occupation, [that] inevitably has an impact on the identification of Israeli Arabs with Israel."⁵⁴ *Haaretz* reported that an earlier draft "also included suggestions for action the EU should take, but these were removed from the final version at the insistence of several countries."⁵⁵

A press release by the Israeli NGO Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel claimed that the leaked EU document “adopts many of the recommendations contained in the report on the ‘European Union and the Palestinian minority in Israel’ prepared by Adalah and the Arab Association for Human Rights and the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) in February 2011.”⁵⁶ (Both groups are funded directly by the EU.)

Additionally, two weeks before the leak, on November 30, 2001, Adalah presented to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EC a “briefing paper” discussing Knesset legislative proposals, the Bedouin in the Negev, “discriminating government policy towards Arab citizens,” and the “attack on human rights organizations and activists”—the same subjects reportedly addressed in the EU document.⁵⁷

EU officials have a close relationship with Adalah, and have previously used information provided by the NGO. In February 2011, following the publication of Adalah’s report and “increased advocacy efforts before the EU,”⁵⁸ the EU released a statement that called upon Israel to “protect the rights of Arab citizens of Israel.”⁵⁹

While the report is markedly different from the other leaked reports in subject and content, it is similar in that it reflects the EU’s reliance on local political advocacy NGOs as “subcontractors” for policymaking on complex Israel-related issues. When, as is usually the case, these NGOs present distorted or inaccurate information and analyses, these are incorporated in the EU policy documents.

EU Report on West Bank Violence

On March 14, 2012, the *EU Observer* reported that EC officials in Ramallah had circulated “an internal three-page report dated February 2012” stating that “Israeli authorities are not doing enough to stop a massive increase in attacks by Jewish extremists against Palestinians.”⁶⁰ This document was later posted online by The Rights Forum, which claimed that it had been “leaked by unknown persons and reached The Rights Forum via-via.”⁶¹ The *EU Observer* reported that the document “depicted settler attacks as part of a broader Israeli campaign to get rid of the Palestinians,” and that “an earlier eight-page EU report on the subject dated April 2011—also seen by this website [the *EU Observer*—said Israel has created an ‘atmosphere of impunity’ for Jewish attackers, amounting to ‘tacit approval by the state.’” The report also cited “settler violence” as a cause of Palestinian terrorism and violence: “[T]he Palestinian population... in the absence of protection or legal remedy may increasingly support other means in an effort to improve their situation.”⁶²

As with the other EU documents related to the Arab–Israeli conflict, a small group of NGOs were central contributors, including B’Tselem, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Save the Children UK, and Yesh Din. For example, the EU report states that “over 90% of complaints and files were completed without indictments... Subsequent reporting has confirmed this trend of impunity.” These data were provided by Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights, a politicized NGO that received approximately €185,000 from the EU in 2012.

As has been widely reported, Yesh Din’s analysis of this and other issues is methodologically flawed. It fails to examine comparative data indicating whether its claims regarding the West Bank are anomalous or typical for police investigations in Israel or elsewhere.⁶³ Data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) demonstrate that in 2011, the Israeli police opened a total of 364,730 files, with 38,334 indictments (10.5 percent) filed, which is very similar to the percentage of indictments filed against settlers.⁶⁴ Thus, in this report, as in the others, the EU’s repetition of NGO allegations without any independent evaluation resulted in misleading policy conclusions.

Implications and Recommendations

While the European Union and its member states highlight the important contributions of “soft power” to their diplomacy, the close relationship between the EU and political advocacy NGOs that claim to have expertise on the Arab–Israeli conflict, as demonstrated in the aforementioned analysis of the seven leaked documents, cannot be said to have made positive contributions to peace, human rights, or other declared foreign policy objectives. The large sums provided by the EU to selected NGOs and the reliance by European officials on the reports of these NGOs created a failed policy process resulting in considerable damage in many dimensions.

In particular, the close alliance with NGOs that lack credibility led EU officials to formulate recommendations that not only do not serve the declared EU objectives, but also may lead to an increase in friction and possibly violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The issues outsourced by the EU to political advocacy NGOs are the most volatile in the conflict, including Jerusalem and the relationship between Israel’s Jewish majority and Arab minority.

The massive funding to these organizations allows them to produce a continuous flow of unsubstantiated reports, which in turn form the main body of “data” that their government funders rely on for policymaking. On this basis, NGOs advertise their influence and boast that their “reports” are used by the EU in areas of decision making, which enhances their image and further increases the

flow of funds. This circular process does not allow for any independent input or dissenting analysis.

In order for the EU and its member states to become relevant actors and avoid counterproductive policies, they must consult with a wide range of experts with varying expertise and analyses. It is further suggested that the EU create a framework within which to independently research and verify the situation on the ground.

Moreover, the fact that much of the EU funding and consulting process involving political NGOs is largely secret and violates European transparency norms adds to the structural failure of this closed policy circle. To provide transparency and to benefit from it, the EU would be well advised to open up all documents and processes related to decision making for NGO funding, including the names of the people involved (in order to verify relevant knowledge and the absence of conflicts of interest), the information provided in considering NGO funding requests, and the evaluations, if any, of NGO performance and impact.

The European Parliament can also play an important role in examining these central issues and problems arising from the relationships between political advocacy NGOs and EU policymaking. The fact that, with one exception,⁶⁵ this relationship is never discussed in the Parliament is itself a sign of decision making failure, since it involves tens of millions of euros from the EC budget every year, and contributes to very damaging policymaking in the sensitive and complex Arab–Israeli conflict zone.

Finally, this analysis and the seven “leaked” EU documents discussed demonstrate that while soft power exerted via NGOs can be used for positive purposes, it is subject to abuse, as is true for “hard power.” Indeed, as shown, without transparency, systemic checks and balances, and other basic dimensions of responsible policymaking, government reliance on political advocacy NGOs for policy input creates dangerous and counterproductive results.

Notes

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³ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁴ Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, XL:2 (2002), 253.

⁵ Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, “Venus Approaching Mars? The EU as an Emerging

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- ¹⁵ EU, "EU Heads of Mission Report on Settler Violence," April 2011, www.rightsforum.org/eur1.html.
- ¹⁶ EU, "EU Note on Settler Violence," February 2012, www.rightsforum.org/eur2.html.
- ¹⁷ EU, "Area C and Palestinian State Building," op. cit., p. 13.
- ¹⁸ EU, "EU Note on Settler Violence," op. cit., p. 2.
- ¹⁹ Keinon, op. cit.
- ²⁰ For information on ICAHD and other NGOs, see www.ngo-monitor.org/ngo_index.php?letter=A.
- ²¹ ICAHD, "No Home, No Homeland: A New Normative Framework for Examining the Practice of Administrative Home Demolitions in East Jerusalem," December, 2011, p. 33, [www.icahd.org/sites/default/files/No%20Home%20No%20Homeland%20V2.0%20\(3\).pdf](http://www.icahd.org/sites/default/files/No%20Home%20No%20Homeland%20V2.0%20(3).pdf).
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- ²⁵ EU, "EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem," 2012, op. cit., p. 1.
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- ²⁹ EU, "EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem," 2010, op. cit., p. 3.
- ³⁰ The term "East Jerusalem" has no legal or precise geographical definition. It can be used to refer to the parts of the city conquered and occupied by the Jordanian Arab Legion in the 1948 war, including the Jewish Quarter and the Temple Mount; to the eastern section of the Corpus Seperatum in the 1947 UN Partition plan; or to parts of Jerusalem defined by other parameters.
- ³¹ Terrestrial Jerusalem is an Israeli political NGO claiming to "track the full spectrum of developments in Jerusalem that could impact either the political process or permanent status options, destabilize the city or spark violence, or create humanitarian crises." "About Terrestrial Jerusalem," undated, <http://t-j.org.il/AboutTJ.aspx>.
- ³² Lara Friedman and Daniel Seidemann, "Settlements in Focus: Top 6 Bogus Excuses for East Jerusalem Settlement Expansion," Americans for Peace Now, March 25, 2010, http://peacenow.org/entries/bogus_excuses_east_jerusalem_settlement_expansion#.T-gzjBce7AI.
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