The Politics of Canadian Government Funding for Advocacy NGOs

NGO MONITOR MONOGRAPH SERIES
VOLUME 10
FEBRUARY 2012

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About NGO Monitor: NGO Monitor provides information and analysis, promotes accountability, and supports discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian agendas.

A special thanks to the Aurea Foundation (Canada) for funding this project.

The Amutah for NGO Responsibility (R.A. 58-0465508)

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Executive Summary

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often portrayed as forces for good that promote universal human rights and international development in a non-partisan manner. This perception produces a “halo effect” around NGOs, which enhances their soft power while reducing public scrutiny of their activities and accountability. Yet growing evidence demonstrates that many NGOs have abandoned universality to engage in partisan advocacy on controversial and divisive issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Canada, many NGOs that have received government funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and other government frameworks promote strident advocacy under the guise of raising public awareness about international development and human rights. Although this advocacy is often inconsistent with the principle of universality as well as Canada’s foreign policy, it is shown to be encouraged to varying degrees by the government agencies responsible for administering public funding. This paper examines four NGOs that received Canadian government funding while promoting partisan advocacy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and assesses both the advocacy activities of the NGOs and the governmental processes that resulted in the allocation of public funds to the NGOs.
Introduction

In February 2009, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney spoke before the Interparliamentary Commission for Combating Anti-Semitism and announced that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Canada that espouse “hateful sentiments” should not receive government funding. Kenney specifically cited statements about the Arab-Israeli conflict made by leaders of the Canadian Arab Federation and the Canadian Islamic Congress as examples (Kenney 2009, February 17). One month later, the government rejected the Canadian Arab Federation’s application for funding renewal (Canwest 2009, March 20). In December 2009, the government decided against extending funding for two more controversial NGOs involved in the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict—Alternatives (based in Montreal) and KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives (Ivison 2009, December 5). In March 2010, another NGO had its funding cut when the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) decided to end funding for Mada al-Carmel, an Israeli-based NGO that also engaged in controversial activities regarding the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Taken together, the series of decisions were interpreted by critics of the government as an attempt to politicize Canadian foreign aid policy and the processes by which NGOs are funded to engage in international development work (Bryden 2009, December 21). A Liberal Party press release regarding KAIROS suggested that the government was “politicizing the public service” (Liberal Party of Canada 2009, December 4) while an NDP press release similarly called upon the government to “eliminate political interference in CIDA’s foreign and development aid decisions” (New Democratic Party of Canada 2010, December 13).

The controversy received considerable media scrutiny and helped focus attention on some of the processes related to the public funding of NGOs in Canada. But while much of the
attention has been devoted to examining the government’s decisions to end funding to KAIROS and other NGOs, almost no attention has been given to examining the processes by which these NGOs applied for and received funding in the first place. Notwithstanding, almost all of the public discussion of these issues has taken for granted that CIDA and IDRC had otherwise acted in a non-political manner prior to the government’s decisions to end funding for the NGOs. Accordingly, several important questions have gone unexplored: What were the goals and agendas of the NGOs? How did they portray these programmes in funding applications? How were funding applications evaluated by the public service funding agencies (CIDA and IDRC), and what were their criteria and agendas in granting funding?

To address these questions, this paper analyzes previously unexamined primary source material including funding applications submitted by selected NGOs, agency evaluations of the funding proposals, and governmental follow-up evaluations of the NGOs’ performance after funding had been granted. We focus on two Canadian NGOs that have received funding from the Canadian International Development Agency—KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives and Alternatives, and two Palestinian NGOs that have received funding from the International Development Research Centre—BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, and Mada al-Carmel (The Arab Center for Applied Social Research). These four NGOs have been selected as case studies primarily because each engaged in substantial partisan advocacy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict while receiving Canadian public funding. Although some of the NGOs engaged in activities involving other issues and regions, we limit our analysis of the organizations to their work regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict because much of the recent public discussion of these NGOs has focused on this issue (Brennan 2010, February 13; Cheadle 2010, February 2). As will be shown below, these four NGOs, to different degrees,
are active in promoting the strategy adopted at the 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) NGO Forum in Durban, which explicitly adopted the goal of promoting the complete international isolation of Israel (Matas n.d., Cotler 2006, September 12). The implementation of the Durban strategy is based on tactics such as BDS (boycotts, divestment and sanctions) that target Israel, “lawfare” cases directed at Israeli officials using universal jurisdiction statutes, and repeated allegations of human rights abuses and violations of international law.

Additionally, focusing on these four NGOs allows us to compare the procedures of two funding agencies in Canada: CIDA and IDRC. The results of this comparison lead us to believe that our case studies may be representative of a broader phenomenon involving Canadian public funding of NGOs engaged in advocacy, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Overall, the major findings of the paper show that Canadian government funding of NGO partisan advocacy on the Arab-Israeli conflict was an act of both commission and omission by the funding agencies. In some cases, particularly at IDRC, NGO advocacy was funded because IDRC officials and the NGOs shared similar political agendas. In other cases, particularly at CIDA, NGO advocacy appeared to be funded largely because the governmental mechanisms to evaluate the activities of funded NGOs were limited, and thus the content of the NGO advocacy may have gone unnoticed. That said, we cannot necessarily rule out the possibility that CIDA officials were aware of, and perhaps indifferent to, or supportive of, the advocacy activities of the NGOs we discuss.

We begin by reviewing the literature addressing the important and growing political role of NGOs and the implications of NGO advocacy. We note how NGOs are often able to escape critical scrutiny and accountability for their actions by portraying themselves as altruistic and non-partisan. We then examine the relationship between the Canadian bureaucracy and the
politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We discuss previous research and evidence which has suggested the existence of anti-Israel bias among members of the foreign policy bureaucracy, specifically at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and note how this evidence challenges the prevailing view of the Canadian bureaucracy as strictly non-partisan. On this basis, we examine CIDA and IDRC, respectively, providing a brief history of each organization and an analysis of each organization’s funding of the NGOs examined. The analysis expands upon existing discussions of anti-Israel bias within the Canadian bureaucracy by providing evidence suggesting the existence of similar sentiments within IDRC, and to a lesser extent CIDA. Additionally, the analysis shows how NGOs in Canada and abroad are able to benefit from what we call the “halo effect” to obtain government funding to advance biased agendas while portraying themselves as non-partisan promoters of universal human rights and international development.

The Politics of NGO Advocacy

In recent decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have come to play an increasingly influential role in both Canadian and international politics. This is particularly true in the fields of human rights and international development, where NGOs publicize alleged abuses (“naming and shaming”) and provide aid to those in need. Governments and the media often view NGOs as trusted sources of expertise, which is a testament to NGO soft-power, defined by Joseph Nye as the ability to “get the outcomes they want through attraction rather than compulsion” (Nye 2004, June 24). Accordingly, NGOs are generally regarded as forces for good, and definitions of the term NGO often include the explicit claim that such organizations are motivated by benevolent and moral principles and not by self-interest or partisan political objectives or
ideology. For example, Volker Heins suggests that NGOs are “inspired by universalistic ideals” to “stand up and speak out not for themselves, but for others” (Heins 2008, 19). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink write that the appeal and proliferation of human rights NGOs is, at least in part, a result of their “principled neutrality” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 90). According to Peter Willets, “[t]here is a widespread attitude that NGOs consist of altruistic people campaigning in the general public interest, while governments consist of self-serving politicians” (Willets 1996).

However, there is also a growing literature pointing to the contrast between this normative ideal and the empirical evidence regarding the activities and impacts of NGOs. Much of this debate focuses on the degree to which human rights and international development NGOs have chosen to abandon universality and principled neutrality in order to promote themselves and engage in political advocacy on controversial issues (Blitt 2004, Habibi 2007, Steinberg 2009).

For their part, NGO officials argue that political advocacy is necessary to move beyond “small-scale successes” and focus on the bigger goal of challenging “the systems and structures which determine the distribution of power and resources within and between societies” (Thompson 1996; see also Ahmed and Potter 2006, 42-43; Bendell 2006, 23-29; Lewis and Kanji 2009, 97-107). Although this shift is welcomed by many in the NGO community, it creates a serious dilemma for these organizations and their funders. By embracing advocacy, particularly in conflict situations, NGOs compromise their status as defenders of universalistic ideals, and become biased and politicized actors. In this mode, NGO transnational advocacy networks may promote a narrow ideology, and offer only one perspective on a controversial matter, contributing to distorted debates and decision making. Accordingly, the rise of NGO advocacy
suggests the need to re-evaluate the widely shared assumption that these organizations are universalistic, politically neutral, and morally righteous.

Concurrently, scholars have begun to raise important questions regarding NGO power and accountability. Unlike sovereign democratic states, which are held accountable by domestic political processes and institutions, NGOs are accountable only to their financial donors and, where applicable, their membership base (Slim 2002, January 10-12). In examining the issue of NGO accountability, Michael Edwards and David Hulme argue that the failure of NGOs “to democratize their own [internal] structures makes them less effective” and “poses a particular problem for ‘downward’ accountability to members and beneficiaries” (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Louis Logister similarly notes that NGO officials “are not bound to act in the public interest. Neither are their actions justified by formal democratic procedures, as is the case with states” (Logister 2007).

Much evidence demonstrates that the internal operations of NGOs, including agenda setting and the selection of executive leadership positions, often function in an opaque manner that is far from transparent to outside observers. Agendas and relative allocation of resources among different issues are determined in closed processes by a few officials, often in a manner which is inconsistent with the moral and legal guidelines proclaimed by these organisations. For example, an extensive quantitative study of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International concluded that the desire for media attention was an important factor for these NGOs in deciding which countries to subject to extensive examination, and which countries to neglect. In some cases, “neglected countries were simply too small, poor, or unnewsworthy to inspire much media interest” (Ron and Ramos 2009). In addition, systematic research showing ideological bias
among officials of such groups highlights the lack of universality, further politicizing the agenda (Mandel 2009, Birnbaum 2010).

The issue of accountability is also salient because NGOs have become powerful political actors, influencing government policies, providing the substance of United Nations reports, initiating legal cases, and, in some instances such as the efforts to prohibit the use of landmines, shepherding treaty texts through international bodies. In recognition of the power of NGOs in world politics, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali referred to NGOs as “an indispensable part of the legitimacy” of the United Nations, while his successor Kofi Annan called NGOs “the conscience of the world” (Kriger and Crahan 2001, 599).

Annan’s characterization is also telling because it demonstrates how NGOs claim to use their power to speak on behalf of others rather than for themselves. For example, the 2001 United Nations WCAR NGO Declaration and Programme of Action explicitly claims to represent the “voices of the victims.” In other contexts, NGOs claim to represent the interests of entire communities within a given country. In some cases, NGOs claim—or are assumed by others—to represent the entirety of “civil society” (Heins 2008). As a result, NGOs create a “halo effect” around themselves, which tends to reduce public scrutiny of their activities and public statements. This absence of accountability enhances the soft power of NGOs and expands their roles as important actors in domestic and world politics.

While private associations are free to set and pursue their own agendas, the policy issues and questions surrounding NGO ideology and partisan advocacy become more complicated when government funding is involved. The positions promoted by these grantees are funded by taxpayers and become vehicles for government policies. This highlights the need for careful consideration of the processes through which governments fund NGOs that are engaged in one-
sided advocacy, the mechanisms by which NGOs are evaluated and held accountable with respect to their use of taxpayer funds, and the resulting impact.

**The External Affairs Bureaucracy and Canada’s Middle East Policy**

As mentioned earlier, much of the discussion of the government’s recent decisions to end funding for certain NGOs has focused on the political motives of the government, and implicitly assumed that the public service otherwise operated without any comparable political interests of its own. However, previous research and events provide evidence suggesting that the Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy often lack political neutrality, at least with respect to the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1987, John Kirton and Peyton Lyon surveyed officials in the Department of External Affairs (DFAIT’s predecessor) regarding their views of the determinants and wisdom of Canada’s foreign policy toward the Middle East (Kirton and Lyon 1989). While noting some diversity, Kirton and Lyon’s findings nevertheless revealed that many officials at the Department of External Affairs (DEA) were clearly sympathetic to the Palestinian narrative and critical of Israel. This research showed that DEA officials saw themselves as “less romantic about Israel” and “less influenced ‘by the Holocaust factor’ ” than Canadian politicians and the general public. Many officials felt that Canada’s foreign policy was tilted too strongly in support of Israel, and that this imbalance should be adjusted by taking measures such as “increasing Canada’s level of diplomatic contact” with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Additionally, many felt that the Canadian media had a pro-Israel bias, while few supported the efforts by the Canadian Jewish community to counter the Arab League economic boycott of Israel. Perhaps most strikingly, when asked to rank the perceived political influence of various key actors in the
shaping of Canada’s policy toward the Middle East, DEA officials placed the “Canadian Jewish community” at the top of the list, ahead of even the Prime Minister and the DEA itself.

Additionally, evidence suggesting anti-Israel sentiments among DFAIT officials surfaced during the establishment of the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement in the mid-1990s. Lyon writes that the Agreement was “strongly opposed by DEA and the Department of Trade and Commerce” which did not want to upset the interests of other governments in the Middle East (Lyon 2010). The issue of anti-Israel sentiments within DFAIT became a very public affair when Norman Spector, a former Canadian ambassador to Israel, claimed in the mid-1990s that DFAIT officials had a “systematic bias” against Israel that was “strong, evident, consistent, and sustained” (Waller 1998). The March 2010 comments by Robert Fowler, a recently retired career diplomat, serve as one recent indicator that anti-Israel views continue to exist among DFAIT officials – at a Liberal Party function, Fowler harshly criticized Canada’s Middle East policy as merely a “scramble to lock up the Jewish vote in Canada” and an abandonment of Canada’s “reputation for fairness and justice” (Ibbitson 2010, March 28).

In this context, one contribution of this paper is to extend the discussion by examining evidence suggesting the existence of similar biases within other Canadian bureaucracies, specifically CIDA and IDRC. In doing so, we also provide additional context of the decisions to grant, and in some cases later terminate, funding to advocacy NGOs such as KAIROS, Alternatives, BADIL and Mada al-Carmel.

**The Canadian International Development Agency and NGOs**

Established in 1968 as the successor to the External Aid Office, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) serves as the major government organ responsible for
administering Canada’s foreign aid and development programs (Morrison 1998). Although CIDA’s exact mandate was left deliberately vague at the time of its creation—David Morrison (1998, 63) notes that the order-in-council creating the agency “specified no functions or responsibilities”—government officials at the time clearly envisioned that the agency would be a major vehicle for advancing Canada’s humanitarian aspirations on the world stage and helping to improve economic conditions in the developing world.

The extent to which CIDA has deviated from its founding humanitarian values to serve less altruistic ends has been the subject of much scholarly and public debate over the years. To some, CIDA’s main motive has been to serve the political interests of the Canadian state (Nossal 1988). To others, CIDA has existed to advance the economic interests of Canadian business (Pratt 1983/84). In 1987, a major Parliamentary report acknowledged that Canadian foreign aid had been “beset with confusion of purpose” (Canadian House Standing Committee). This naturally contributed to suboptimal results. In 2007, a highly critical Senate report concluded that Canada’s foreign aid policies toward Africa amounted to “40 years of failure” and recommended that Canada “should conduct an immediate review of the future” of CIDA “to determine whether the agency should be abolished or whether it should be improved with a statutory mandate” (Canadian Senate Standing Committee, X-XI).

In 2008, the government acknowledged the problems, and responded by adopting Bill C-293, which provided CIDA with an explicit legislative mandate to focus on “poverty reduction ... in a manner that is consistent with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, sustainable development and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights standards” (Bill C-293). Thus, CIDA currently states that its mandate is to “manage Canada’s support and resources effectively and accountably to achieve meaningful, sustainable results and engage in
policy development in Canada and internationally, enabling Canada’s effort to realize its
development objectives” (Canadian International Development Agency. n.d.).

From the beginning, CIDA officials viewed NGOs as playing an important role in
assisting the government’s international development programs. Accordingly, in its first year,
CIDA established an NGO Division that allowed the agency to “draw on the unique expertise
and experience of the NGO sector on a cooperative basis” by distributing funding to NGOs to
administer specific development projects. According to CIDA, this was a novel approach that
made it “the first development agency in the Western world to establish a program of
cooperation between government and private development agencies working in the third world”
(Canadian International Development Agency, 1986, 5-6). Over the years, the budget of the
NGO Division grew rapidly—by the early 1990s, disbursements to NGOs topped $220 million,
nearly a sixfold increase since the mid-1970s (Brodhead and Pratt 1994, 92).

Like other aspects of CIDA’s work, the NGO Division was subject to criticism regarding
its motivations and effectiveness. Perhaps the most common criticism, often made directly by
NGOs and their supporters, was that NGOs were given insufficient ability to shape development
policy and that the government was effectively co-opting NGOs to serve its own interests under
the radar (Brodhead and Pratt 1994). But the proponents of this position, to a large extent,
viewed NGOs through the halo effect and interpreted disagreements between NGOs and
government as a conflict between non-partisan NGOs and a self-interested government.
However, as demonstrated in the case studies below, NGOs such as KAIROS and Alternatives
possessed clear partisan agendas, which were reflected in their criticisms of government policies.
Accordingly, there is a need to re-examine the broader narrative surrounding the Canadian
government’s funding relationship with advocacy NGOs.
KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives

KAIROS-Canada is an umbrella framework consisting of 11 member churches, and describes itself as a “faith-based ecumenical organization” that “effects social change through advocacy, education and research programs in: Ecological Justice, Economic Justice, Energy and Extraction, Human Rights, Just and Sustainable Livelihoods, and Indigenous Peoples” (KAIROS n.d. a)\(^1\). KAIROS’ activities are both domestic and international, but because KAIROS does not have personnel or field offices in the developing world, its international activities are conducted by forming formal partnerships with like-minded NGOs based abroad. While KAIROS’ international activities take place in about a dozen developing countries, the organization’s political advocacy activities have, in recent years, specifically highlighted four “countries of concern”: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Palestine and Israel, and Sudan (KAIROS n.d. b).

KAIROS’ activities regarding the Middle East have demonstrated a consistent biased agenda. For example, in 2007, the NGO lobbied the Canadian government to “end its financial embargo of the Palestinian Authority and restore aid financing, including an immediate donation of the moneys suspended in the last year” (KAIROS, 2007, April 18). The embargo had been enacted following the 2006 election for the Palestinian Legislative Council, in which a majority of seats were won by Hamas. Although Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization by Canada, the United States and the European Union, KAIROS followed a number of pro-

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\(^1\) While sharing the same name, KAIROS-Canada is formally separate from and independent of KAIROS-Palestine. The 11 Member Churches of KAIROS-Canada are the Anglican Church of Canada, the Christian Reformed Church in North America, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, the United Church of Canada, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Canadian Religious Conference, the Mennonite Central Committee of Canada and the Primate’s World Relief and Development Fund (PWRDF).
Palestinian groups in strongly critiquing this Canadian policy, claiming without evidence that Palestinians who voted for Hamas “did not vote to destroy Israel, nor do they want this” (Corkery and De Jonghe 2006, December 22). In December 2008, KAIROS actively lobbied Canada to “publicly call for an end to Israel’s bombing of Gaza” (KAIROS 2008, December 29).

KAIROS-Canada is also active in the BDS campaign that targets Israel through its support of divestment techniques. In October 2005, KAIROS was among the co-sponsors of an international conference that “brought together a range of churches and organizations to discuss strategies” for what conference participants called “morally responsible investment” toward Israel. Among the recommendations that KAIROS endorsed is that “where KAIROS members opt to pursue shareholder action respecting Canadian companies doing business in Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territories (that are contributing directly or indirectly to violence, occupation or other human rights abuses in the region), shareholder action shall move through several stages, from dialogue with senior company management to filing shareholder proposals and, as a last resort, divestment” (KAIROS 2008, January 7).

Although KAIROS was founded in 2001, its precursor organizations have been funded by CIDA since 1973 (KAIROS n.d. c). According to the Public Accounts of Canada, KAIROS has received $7,240,475 from the Canadian government since the 2000-2001 fiscal year, of which all but about $128,000 was distributed through CIDA.

Several of KAIROS’ recent funding proposals to CIDA clearly indicated the NGO’s partisan approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, in its 2006 proposal, KAIROS characterized the large-scale violence between 2001 and 2004 in a narrative that erased the context of Palestinian suicide bombing and other terror attacks that killed several hundred Israelis, and blamed only Israel for hardships facing the Palestinians. Thus, the intifada “had a
severe impact on the Palestinian economy due to Israeli security measures” and “Israel’s construction of the wall compounded with its policies of curfews, closures and restrictions on movement are violating the most basic human rights of Palestinians to education, health care, safe water, adequate sanitation and a clean environment” (KAIROS n.d. c). Similarly, KAIROS’ 2009 proposal referred to Gaza as “under siege” but made no mention of Hamas and its rocket attacks that preceded Operation Cast Lead (KAIROS 2009, June 26). However, KAIROS did not mention in any of its CIDA proposals that it actively supported divestment against Israel as part of the BDS campaign.

As mentioned, KAIROS’ activities in the Middle East are conducted through formal partnerships with local NGOs. Accordingly, KAIROS’ funding proposals to CIDA indicate that a portion of CIDA funding is to be transferred to these NGOs. KAIROS’ NGO partners include advocacy organizations such as Sabeel: Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, the Jerusalem Center for Women and Bat Shalom, which advance similar biased agendas. For example, Sabeel (based in Bethlehem) was a major organizer of the October 2005 conference to promote the BDS campaign against Israel (Sabeel n.d.) while the Jerusalem Center for Women and Bat Shalom have accused Israel of “ethnic cleansing,” “apartheid,” and “collective punishment” (The Jerusalem Link 2003, February 18). From 2006-2010, CIDA transferred $135,000 to the three NGOs via KAIROS (KAIROS n.d. c).

As in any government use of taxpayer funds, the independent evaluation of NGOs is expected to be a central element of the decision-making process. In the case of CIDA’s evaluations of KAIROS, the evidence suggests that the agency did not ensure independent and rigorous evaluation. For example, CIDA’s February 2009 evaluation of KAIROS was conducted solely by Susan Harvie, who had previously been a project officer for the Montreal-based
Alternatives, and her selection for conducting an evaluation suggests a built-in bias. Information on the process by which she was chosen, and the qualifications that were used in this decision, is not available. Harvie’s February 2009 evaluation notably omitted any examination of KAIROS’ Middle East NGO partners, although three other NGO partners from different geographical regions were examined. The evaluation report claimed that KAIROS possesses “good judgment in research, policy development, advocacy and grassroots mobilization” and that “KAIROS chooses its partners in accordance with criteria which ensure that KAIROS and its partners share a common philosophy, objectives and program strategies” (Harvie 2009, February). Harvie’s evaluation also failed to discuss KAIROS’ support for divestment as part of the BDS campaign, despite the fact that the evaluation included an appendix reproducing the minutes of a KAIROS board meeting on September 15, 2008, in which KAIROS board members discussed in some detail their plans to protest the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement. At minimum, such an omission suggests a lack of effective oversight in CIDA’s evaluations of NGOs that it funds. It may also indicate that some officials at CIDA are sympathetic to the BDS campaign against Israel.

Following Harvie’s evaluation, officials at DFAIT subsequently expressed concern to CIDA that they had “insufficient information on [the] legitimacy of [the] local partners” in the Middle East (Lyon-Villager n.d.). CIDA’s only response appeared to be an informal consultation with Equitas—a non-profit organization founded in 1967 that helps train human rights advocates and educators—regarding the NGOs, which resulted in one CIDA official declaring that the NGOs were “legitimate and trusted” (Lyon-Villager n.d.). No basis was provided for this statement, and it is not clear why CIDA consulted Equitas in the first place. Indeed, Equitas may not have been an appropriate source to rely upon because it played a central role in establishing
the Arab Network for Human Rights and Citizenship Education (AHRNE), a network of NGOs that includes, among others, Al Haq and the Teacher’s Creativity Center, two organizations that actively support the BDS campaign against Israel (Equitas n.d.).

Overall, CIDA’s evaluations of KAIROS relied heavily on the work of individuals and groups that held partisan views on the Middle East that were similar to the views of KAIROS. Thus, CIDA did not express concern when presented with evidence of KAIROS’ anti-Israel activities, such as the NGO’s support of divestment techniques. In other instances, CIDA’s evaluation was simply not rigorous enough to detect such activities in the first place, as evidenced by, for example, the lack of evaluation of KAIROS’ Middle East NGO partners.

Alternatives

Founded in 1994, Alternatives is a Montreal-based NGO that describes itself as an “international solidarity and development non-governmental organization” that “wishes to foster social justice, participatory democracy and equal relations between the North and South, as well as the protection of the environment.” Alternatives also states that one of its missions is “to inform Canadians about national and international issues” (Alternatives 2007-2008).

Reflecting the “international solidarity” mission, Alternatives engages in extensive political advocacy on many issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its website publishes numerous editorials echoing the Durban NGO agenda, promoting allegations that Israel is a colonial and apartheid state, and promoting the BDS campaign that targets Israel (Mac Allister 2009, February 6; Warschawski 2009, August 13; Warschawski 2009, November 26). A 2009 editorial published on the website makes the claim that “Hamas is an armed Palestinian resistance group. It resists against the occupation regime and Israeli colonialism. This resistance
is legal and legitimate” (Mac Allister 2009, February 6). Additionally, Alternatives played a central role in founding the Centre for Media Alternatives – Quebec (CMAQ), an online media centre that engages in similar political advocacy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict (Centre for Media Alternatives—Quebec 2002, January 23). One editorial on the CMAQ website endorses a boycott of Israeli academic institutions (Lessard 2009, January 24). Another editorial endorses the BDS movement against Israel (Vilkomerson 2009, July 14).

According to the Public Accounts of Canada, Alternatives has received $18,950,277 from the Canadian government since the 2000-2001 fiscal year, of which all but about $480,000 came from CIDA. In the spring of 2009, CIDA officials were reported to have approved funding for an additional three years, but in late 2009, media reports suggested that CIDA had decided against renewed funding for Alternatives (Ivison 2009 December 5). Later reports claimed that CIDA had granted limited funding to Alternatives, but not for any purposes related to the Middle East (Canadian Press 2010, July 31).

Of the four NGOs examined in this paper, Alternatives’ funding proposals to CIDA reveal the least about the NGO’s strongly partisan approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One notable exception is found in a May 2004 report to CIDA in which Alternatives indicated that it had recently organized a speaking engagement in Canada by a member of the Israel-based NGO Gush Shalom who condemned Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians as “colonialist” and “imperialist” (Alternatives 2004, May). However, for the most part, Alternatives’ communications with CIDA conceal the NGO’s biased agenda. References to its Canadian public awareness campaigns, including its online journal, do not mention the inflammatory content contained therein. Similarly, Alternatives’ CIDA funding proposals discussed the NGO’s formal partnerships with two Middle East-based NGOs—the Alternative Information Center
(AIC) and the Teacher’s Creativity Center (TCC)—without providing key information on either organization. CIDA was not informed that the AIC has frequently accused Israel of ethnic cleansing and apartheid (Guediri and Dallasheh 2004), and that the TCC has endorsed the BDS campaign discussed above (Palestinian Call for Boycott 2005, July 9). By neglecting to mention this information to CIDA, Alternatives was able to avoid scrutiny of its extensive advocacy activities regarding Israel.

Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that this may have been part of a deliberate strategy to conceal controversial information from CIDA. In a November 2000 email exchange between Michel Lambert, executive director and co-founder of Alternatives, and two other officials of the NGO—Jaggi Singh and Nicolas Lefebvre—Singh discussed the role of Alternatives in establishing the CMAQ by stating that “it’s great that alternatives is using its money and resources to fund the cmaq site and a potential center in quebec city (i have no problem using cida money to undermine cida or promoting genuinely radical projects)”[sic] ([IMC-Editorial] 2000, November 9). This comment about the use of CIDA money, which was not renounced by Michel Lambert, highlights the problematic nature of CIDA’s partnership with Alternatives. Presumably CIDA could not have been aware that it was funding an NGO whose activities, in part, were intended to undermine the agency. Yet due to the shortcomings of CIDA’s evaluation and oversight mechanisms of NGOs, it appears that the agency was largely unaware of the vast extent of Alternatives’ anti-Israel agenda and activities.

The International Development Research Centre (IRDC)

Established by an Act of Parliament in 1970, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Crown corporation designed to supplement Canada’s efforts to promote economic
and political development in the developing world (International Development Research Centre 2010). Andrew Cooper succinctly characterizes IDRC’s function as “CIDA’s research arm,” (Cooper 1997, 217) although the Centre reports directly to Parliament. According to its founding act, the IDRC’s mandate is “to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions.” To this end, the Centre performs several complimentary tasks. Among other things, it can “establish, maintain and operate information and data centres and facilities for research and other activities” and “support or assist research by governments, by international, public or private organizations and agencies, or by individuals” (International Development Research Centre n.d. a). As a research centre, the IDRC describes itself as “a different kind of public institution” because it is strictly “apolitical” (International Development Research Centre 2010, 5).

The IDRC began funding research projects in the West Bank and Gaza in 1984. As of April 2010, the centre has supported 91 different projects in the region totalling $16.6 million (International Development Research Centre n.d. b). The issue of Palestinian refugees has been a particularly important focus, particularly after the 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference, at which a number of multilateral working groups were established, and Canada became responsible for the refugee dimension. In this context, in 1992, the IDRC established a “special fund for research on Palestinian refugees” that “focused on four themes: compensating Palestinian refugees; repatriating refugees to a Palestinian state; engaging the public in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza about the peace process; and understanding the needs of Lebanon, which hosts more than 400,000 refugees” (International Development Research Centre n.d. b).
The IDRC states that its “support for research in Palestinian institutions and nongovernmental organizations fits within the framework of Canada’s Middle East policy” (International Development Research Centre n.d. b).

Notwithstanding the Centre’s claim to be apolitical and to implement its mandate in a manner consistent with Canadian policy, several IDRC-funded projects in the West Bank and Gaza have clearly reflected pro-Palestinian political agendas, and the IDRC has funded several political NGOs with well documented records of partisan advocacy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This can be seen by examining the funding processes behind two NGOs: BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, and Mada al-Carmel (The Arab Center for Applied Social Research). The evidence reveals that both NGOs explicitly declared in their funding proposals their intentions to engage in controversial advocacy, and that their advocacy goals were a central reason behind the IDRC’s decision to fund them. Thus, while CIDA’s support for advocacy NGOs appears to have been largely an act of omission, the IDRC’s support for advocacy NGOs was a clear act of commission.

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights

Based in Bethlehem, BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights was founded in 1998 with a mandate “to defend and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees and IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons]” (BADIL n.d. a) As an advocacy organization, BADIL regularly produces one-sided press releases, publications, and other activities in support of the Palestinian narrative. For example, BADIL frequently refers to Israel as an “apartheid” state,
(BADIL n.d. b) and was one of the original signatories of the July 9, 2005 Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel (Palestinian Call for Boycott 2005, July 9).

The IDRC funded two BADIL projects in 2002 for a total of $97,520. The first supported the research, publication, and distribution of two BADIL briefs addressing, respectively, Palestinian women and children (International Development Research Centre n.d. c). The second supported the research, publication, and distribution of a brief on the history of the Palestinian village of Lubya in the Lake Tiberias region of Israel (International Development Research Centre n.d. d). In both instances, BADIL’s funding proposals to the IDRC clearly indicated the partisan advocacy nature of the projects. In one funding proposal submitted for the period 1999-2001, BADIL described its “long term aim” by claiming that its “information and media work is thus not motivated by academic or journalistic interest, but aims to develop innovative resources which can advance the Palestinian refugees’ right to return, restitution and compensation, and Palestinian rights in Jerusalem” (BADIL 1999). Accordingly, BADIL indicated that the target audiences for the projects included Palestinian and international policy makers, the media, and the “Liberal/left Zionist political sector” in Israel (International Development Research Centre n.d. e).

Internal IDRC documents reveal that the Centre offered explicit funding support for this political agenda. According to the IDRC evaluations of BADIL’s proposals, the Centre characterized the NGO as “part of the international effort to fight phenomena of military occupation, racism, colonialism and Apartheid,” thus embracing and helping to promote BADIL’s biased presentation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the 2001 Durban Declaration. The IDRC further endorsed a strictly partisan set of political recommendations including “the recognition and implementation of Palestinian refugees’ rights to return to their
places of origin, to regain title of their properties and to receive adequate compensation for losses, damages and more than five decades of human suffering in the framework of historical reconciliation and a durable peace agreement with Israel” (International Development Research Centre n.d. f). By adopting the maximalist Palestinian position on this core element of the conflict, the IDRC effectively became a party to the dispute, in a manner entirely inconsistent with the Canadian government’s policy of promoting compromise and mutual understanding.

An internal IDRC memo reveals that an overarching motivating factor for the Centre was that it was “concerned with maintaining a focus on requirements for strengthening Palestinian negotiating positions.” The Centre had “identified the need to build the Palestinian communications capacity, especially relating to communication with the Israeli and western public” and noted, in reference to the proposed BADIL publications on Palestinian refugees, that “since one of the main activities of this project is to do that, therefore this project is very relevant to our work” (International Development Research Centre n. d. f). The IDRC further noted that the “overall objectives” of the BADIL projects were “to enrich the local and international debate about strategies for the defense of Palestinian refuses [sic] rights through producing a number of easy to read booklets for activists (in and outside of Palestine)” and that BADIL’s projects would “provide a basis for intermediate education and advocacy among relevant UN institutions and organs as well as local and international NGOs” (International Development Research Centre n. d. f).

As such, the evidence clearly reveals that the IDRC was not acting as an apolitical source of funding for academic research, but instead sought to help advance the political cause of one side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Mada al-Carmel (The Arab Center for Applied Social Research)
Based in Haifa, Mada al-Carmel states that its mandate is to use “theoretical and applied social research and policy analysis ... to enhance the human and national development of the Palestinians in Israel, advance the cause of democratic citizenship, and become a hub of knowledge and critical thinking about Palestinians in Israel, equal citizenship, and democracy” (Mada al-Carmel n.d.). Despite its claims to be a research center, Mada al-Carmel engages in a variety of one-sided advocacy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bi-monthly online publication, Jadal, contains editorials accusing Israel of committing “ethnic cleansing” during the “Nakba” in 1948 (Mada al-Carmel 2009, May). In May 2007, Mada al-Carmel issued the “Haifa Declaration,” a political manifesto that accuses Israel of racism, colonialism, and having “carried out policies of subjugation and oppression in excess of those of the apartheid regime in South Africa” (Mada al-Carmel 2007, May 15).

The IDRC funded three of Mada al-Carmel’s major projects, beginning in 2006, for a total of $937,000. One project concerned the establishment of a Gender Unit at Mada al-Carmel (International Development Research Centre n.d. g), the second was a study of “Arab political participation” in Israel (International Development Research Centre n.d. h) and the third was a study of the “economic rights of Palestinian Women in Israel” (International Development Research Centre n.d. i). In all three cases, Mada al-Carmel’s funding proposals to the IDRC clearly indicated the NGO’s advocacy goals. For example, the proposed study of Palestinian women was intended to “examine and critique Israeli policy” and “develop policy-oriented recommendations to inform and influence policy-making” (Mada al-Carmel 2008, October 22, 11-12). The Gender Unit was similarly designed to serve as a “research/advocacy organization” (International Development Research Centre 2006, May 30).
Mada al-Carmel’s funding proposals contained numerous tendentious statements concerning Israel. The NGO accused Israel of being “an ‘ethnocratic’ regime wherein rights and agency—political, economic, and spatial—are exclusive to Jews” (Mada al-Carmel 2008, October 22, 2) and stated that its proposed research was based on an assumption that viewed Israel “not as a democratic state, but rather as a colonial power that treats its Palestinian ‘citizens’ as a colonial Other” (Mada al-Carmel 2008, October 22, 3). Mada al-Carmel’s proposals to the IDRC favourably referenced the Haifa Declaration, but claimed only that it represented a progressive view of “democracy, identity, and equality in Israel” (International Development Research Centre n.d. j).

As reflected in these documents, the IDRC appeared to support Mada al-Carmel’s criticisms of Israel, and certainly endorsed the NGO’s proposed advocacy goals. For example, IDRC officials wrote of their support for the proposed Gender Unit project because it “addresses an identifiable gap in research on, and advocacy for, Palestinian women within Israel” and also noted that Mada al-Carmel “will have to be encouraged to cultivate linkages with advocacy NGOs” (International Development Research Centre 2006, May 30). Going further, the IDRC declared that the results of another Mada al-Carmel project would be used “to engage in evidence-based policy dialogue with state decision-makers and other stakeholders” (International Development Research Centre 2008, December 19).

In a May 2009 internal review of its funding for Mada al-Carmel, IDRC officials provided a positive evaluation of the advocacy activism of the Gender Unit. The IDRC review noted that one result of the project was the convening of a conference “commemorating the Palestinian Nakba,” and claimed that “the project was important to fund since Palestinian women
in Israel are an invisible minority, whose rights as Israeli citizens have been denied and invisibilized by the state” (International Development Research Centre 2009, May 28).

Overall, the evidence demonstrates that Mada al-Carmel’s activities in these and related projects were not limited to the advancement of women in Arab-Israeli society, but were also focused on promoting advocacy in the context of the wider conflict. In addition, the research aspect, as required by the IRDC’s mandate, appeared to be a thin veneer used to cover the NGO’s advocacy agenda.

In March 2010, the IDRC announced the cancellation of its funding for two of Mada al-Carmel’s projects. Officials explained that the “termination is solely as a result of a review of programming strategy within IDRC and is by no means a reflection of the quality of work being done” (McGregor 2010, April 8). The IDRC explained this change in policy on the basis of its mandate to focus on developing world countries, which therefore excludes funding organizations in Israel, which is considered a developed state. The IDRC also stated that the quality of Mada al-Carmel’s work was not in question. In response, Mada al-Carmel filed suit with the Canadian government alleging lack of cause, and claims that the funding termination was the result of political interference. The NGO’s allegations were echoed in a number of Canadian media outlets, including the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, reflecting the power of the NGO’s halo effect. But while the media reports focused heavily on the government’s decision to end funding for Mada al-Carmel, it neglected to provide any analysis of the processes by which the NGO received funding in the first place.

Conclusion
By claiming to advance universal and non-partisan goals, NGOs portray themselves to
government officials, journalists, and the general public as impartial arbiters of right and wrong,
and as trusted sources of expertise about international development and human rights issues. This
halo effect enhances the soft power of NGOs while reducing critical scrutiny and accountability,
even as some NGOs increasingly engage in controversial political advocacy. The fact that
governments increasingly rely upon—and finance—NGOs as important partners to advance
international development and human rights policies makes the issues of NGO advocacy and
accountability all the more salient. In this context, this paper has contributed to an emerging
literature that critically examines the political role of NGOs as well as the politics behind
government funding of NGO advocacy.

Focusing on Canada, our case studies demonstrate that several NGOs that receive
government funding engage in extensive partisan advocacy, particularly on the Arab-Israeli
conflict, in a manner that contradicts the notion of universality as well as Canadian policy toward
the Middle East. The evidence further reveals that Canadian government officials and institutions
appear, in some instances, to explicitly encourage biased NGO advocacy, which is an important
phenomenon that has thus far been entirely underexplored. As demonstrated in these case
studies, the failure to conduct rigorous and independent evaluations contributed to a contrast
between government policy objectives on the one hand, and the activities of CIDA and IRDC-
funded NGO programmes on the other.

We argue that additional research on these issues is necessary, particularly because of our
belief that the case studies examined in this paper are not isolated examples, but rather indicative
of a broader phenomenon. As the annual Public Accounts of Canada show, there are literally
hundreds, if not thousands, of NGOs that receive government funding every year, and this
includes funding only from the federal government, not from provincial and municipal
governments, which also fund NGOs in some instances. Thus, the politics of NGO advocacy and
government funding in Canada, and the processes of evaluation that are employed for this use of
taxpayer funds, constitute important research issues that deserve greater scholarly attention and
analysis. While it is important to focus attention on the processes by which NGOs have had their
government funding ended, it is equally important to examine the processes by which NGOs
applied for and received funding in the first place.

References


Bill C-293, an Act respecting the provision of development assistance abroad, received Royal Assent on May 29, 2008.


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